Leland A. Fitzgerald and Helen S. Fitzgerald v. Utah County, a body corporate and politic of the State of Utah and a governmental entity of the State of Utah Jeff Mendenhall, Gordon Buckley Rose, Iva Snell, Keith Richan, Jeril Wilson, Lynn Davis and John Does 4 trough 20 : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
Leland A. Fitzgerald and Helen S. Fitzgerald v. Utah
County, a body corporate and politic of the State of
Utah and a governmental entity of the State of Utah
Jeff Mendenhall, Gordon Buckley Rose, Iva Snell,
Keith Richan, Jeril Wilson, Lynn Davis and John
Does 4 trough 20 : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jody K. Burnett; Craig L. Barlow; Snow, Christensen & Martineau; Attorneys for Respondents.
M. Dayle Jeffs; Jeffs & Jeffs; Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation





50 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
boi V*\f2*\ FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
LELAND A. FITZGERALD and * 




UTAH COUNTY, a body corporate * 
and politic of the State of * Case number 89-4123 Utah and a governmental * entity of the State of Utah, * 
JEFF MENDENHALL. GORDON * 
BUCKLEY ROSE, IVA SNELL, * 
KEITH RICHAN. JERIL WILSON. * 
LYNN DAVIS and JOHN DOES * 
4 through 20. * 
Defendants. * 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER DISMISSING ALL CLAIMS 
ENTERED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH. CENTRAL DIVISION 
Honorable J. Thomas Greene, District Court Judge 
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT 
M. DAYLE JEFFS, #G1655 
JEFFS AND JEFFS 
Attorneys at Law, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
90 North 100 East 
P. O. Box 888 
Provo. Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
w Jody K. Burnett 
Craig L. Barlow "niteJGi. 
Snow. Christensen 6. Martineau 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84145 tj 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Citii\-. 
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
LELAND A. FITZGERALD and 
HELEN S. FITZGERALD, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UTAH COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of 
Utah and a governmental 
entity of the State of Utah, 
JEFF MENDENHALL, GORDON 
BUCKLEY ROSE, IVA SNELL, 
KEITH RICHAN, JERIL WILSON, 
LYNN DAVIS and JOHN DOES 
4 through 20, 
Defendants. 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER DISMISSING ALL CLAIMS 
ENTERED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
Honorable J. Thomas Greene, District Court Judge 
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT 
M. DAYLE JEFFS, #G1655 
JEFFS AND JEFFS 
Attorneys at Law, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
90 North 100 East 
P. O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
Jody K. Burnett 
Craig L. Barlow 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
* 




Attorneys for Respondents 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CASES ill 
JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
ARGUMENT OF CASE 16 
Point I 
Plaintiffs1 Federal Constitutional claims are 
sufficient as a matter of law to require 
factual determinations by the jury. 
A. The applicable statutes and 
ordinances in question exceed the 
state*s police power and are therefore 
constitutionally invalid. 
B. The Utah County Board of Adjustment 
does not have the authority to review 
the subject matter of this suit. 
C. Denial of approval of the waiver of 
plat filing requirements does not 
provide Judicial Review since under 
state law all ogvernmental entites could 
be immune from suit. 
Point II: 29 
The trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment on the defemation plus constitutional 
injury issue. 
Point III: 44 
The actions of Utah county constitute a 
"taking1* under established law 
CONCLUSION 49 
JUDGMENT DATED 24 AUGUST 1989 Exhibit A 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED 2 8 SEPTEMBER, 198 8 Exhibit B 














ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Affidavit of Leland A. Fitzgerald, dated 
September 18. 1987. 
Affidavit of J. Walter Fitzgerald and Printess 
K. Fitzgerald, dated September 18. 1987. 
Affidavit of Leland 
February 1989. 
Fitzgerald, dated 
Memorandum Decision of the United States 
District Court, dated September 7, 1988. 
Memorandum Decision of the United States 
District Court, dated July 25, 1989. 
Complaint in the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah, Utah County v. 
Leland A. Fitzgerald and Helen S. Fitzgerald, 
dated March 9, 1982. 
Lis Pendens, dated March 9, 1982. 
Restrictive Covenants, recorded December 1980. 
Restrictive Covenants, recorded May 14, 1981. 
State Statute 17-27-27, Utah Code Annotated 
Utah County ordinance 4-3-53 
Stipulation and Agreement dismissing suit in 
State Court, dated September 21, 1984 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases: 
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 
158-159 (1970) 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 J.S. 242, 248, 31 
255 (1986) 
Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Co., 579 P.2d 914 
(Utah 1978) 
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) 
Birch v. Fuller, 9 Utah 2d 79, 337 P.2d 
964 (1959) 
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 565, 30 
33 L.ED. 2d 584 
Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 
1975) 
Central Bank & Trust Company vs. Brimhall, 497 23 
P.2d 638 (Utah 1972) 
Corbitt v. Anderson, 778 F.22d 1471, 1474-75 
(10th Cir. 1985) 
Crestview-Holliday Homeowners Association v. 
Enqh Floral Company 545 P.2d 1150, 1152 
(Utah 1976) 
Doe v. U.S. Department of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092 
1109 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
Euclid v. Ambler Reality Company, 272 U.S. 365 
388 (1926) 
First Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale 44, 45 
v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S.Ct 2378, 
96 L.Ed 2, 265 
Fuentes v. Shevin, 406 U.S. 67, 32 L.Ed. 2d 556 
Gomez v. Toledo 446 U.S. 635, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 27 
614 L.Ed 2d 72 (1980) 
Hall v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) 
-iii-
Hamlin v. Matarcozzo, 293 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1972) 
Hidden Meadows Development Company v. Mills. 
590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979) 
Horn v. County of Ventura. 596 P.2d 1134. 1138 
(Cal 1979) 
Hudson v. Palmer. 468 U.S. 517. 532. n.12 (1984) 
Johnson v. Salt Lake City. 629 P.2d 432 (1981) 
Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Agency. 621 
P.2d 1234 (1980) 
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 
538. 92 S.Ct. 1113. 31 L.Ed 2d 424 (1972) 
Madsen v. Borthick. 658 P.2d 627 (Utah. 1983) 
Mannero v. City of Halech. 625 F. 2d 499 
(5th Cir. 1980) 
Monell v. New York City Department of Social 
Services. 436 U.S. 65, 691 (1978) 
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission. 97 
L.Ed 2d 677. 687 107 S.Ct 381. 481. 
55 U.S.L.W. 5154. (1987) 
Parratt v. Taylor. 451 U.S. 527 at 542 (1981) 
Patsy v. Board of Regents. 454 U.S. 813 (1982) 
Paul v. Davis. 424 U.S. 693. 701 (1976) 
Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahan. 260 U.S. 393 
67 L.Ed 322. 43 S.Ct. 158. 28 A.L.R. 1321 
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System. Inc.. (1 
368 U.S. 464, 7 L.Ed 2d 458. 82 S. Ct. 486. 
5 FR Serv 2d 886 
Pride Oil Company v. Salt Lake County. 13 Utah 
2d 183. 370 P.2d 355 (1962) 
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company, 13 Wall 166. 
167-178-20 L.Ed 557 (1872) 
Redd v. Western Savings & Loan Company, 646 P.2d 
(Utah 1982) 
-iv-
Redhouse v. Quality Ford Sales, Inc.. (1975. CA 
10 Utah) 511 F2d 230. 19 FR Serv 2d 1309. on 
reh (CA 10 Utah) 523 F2d 1, 20 FR Serv 2d 864 
Rios v. Cessna Finance Corp.. 488 F. 2d 25 
(10th Cir. 1973) 
Ritzholz v. City of Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 385, 
284 P.2d 702 (1955) 
South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt. 491 F.2d 5, 7. 
(5th Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 419 U.S. 
837 (1974) 
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 605 P.2d 
1230 (1980) 
Thurston v. Cache Valley 626 P.2d 440 
(Utah. 1981) 
United States v. Community Bank & Trust Company. 
768 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1988) 
Walker Bank & Trust v. Taylor, 390 P.2d 592 
(Utah, 1964). 
Washington EX REL. Seattle Title Trust Corp.. v. 
Roburq. 36 A.L.R. 654 (1928) 
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. 
Hamilton Bank. 413 U.S. 172. 87 L:.Ed 2d 126. 
105 S.Ct. 3108. 3121 (1985) 
RELATED CASES: 
Walter Fitzgerald et al. v. Utah County. 
Case number 88-2384 
STATUTES 
28 U.S.C. 1343 
28 U.S.C. §1983 
42 U.S.C. 1988 






78-40-2 37. 39, 41 
Ordinances of Utah County 
4-3-53 5. 18, 21. 22. 46 
4-7-13 24 
OTHER AUTHORITIES: 
Burby. Handbook of the Law of Real Property (1965) 334 
RELATED OR PRIOR APPEALS 
J. WALTER FITZGERALD and BETTY FITZGERALD. and 
PRINTESS K. FITZGERALD and JENIECE FITZGERALD vs. 
UTAH COUNTY. IVA SNELL, BUCKLEY ROSE and JEFF 
MENDENHALL. KEITH RICHAN. JERIL WILSON. LYNN DAVIS 
and JOHN DOES 4 through 10. 
In the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, 
Case no.: 88-2384 
-vi-
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of the United States District Court was 
premised on 28 U.S. C. §1343, 42 U.S. C. §1983, and 42 U.S.C. 
§1988 and by virtue of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction of 
state law claims. 
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is conferred by 
the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §1291. 
Judgment was entered August 21, 1989. Notice of 
Appeal was filed September 15, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether there are issues of fact which preclude 
the granting of summary judgment on the constitutionality of 
the county ordinances. 
2. Whether the ruling by the trial court on the 
constitutionality of the county ordinances is erroneous as a 
matter of law. 
3. Whether there was presented to the trial court 
sufficient basis for the trial court to hold that appellants 
had not exhausted adequate state remedies. 
4. Whether the ruling by the trial court on the 
issue of the adequacy of state remedies is erroneous as a 
matter of law. 
5. Whether there are fact issues which make the 
granting of summary judgment on the issue of defamation plus 
damage to a property interest erroneous. 
6. Whether the trial court's grant of summary judg-
ment on the issue of defamation plus injury to a property 
interest is erroneous as a matter of law. 
7. Whether there are issues of fact and law which 
preclude the summary judgment on the issue of an un-
constitutional 'taking'. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs/Appellants are the owners of real estate 
holdings in an agricultural area of Cedar Valley, Utah. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants attempted to sell substantial parts of 
their farming interests in tracts of 160 acres or larger by 
complying with the County ordinances enacted under state 
legislation exempting sales of land for agricultural purposes 
from subdivision plat filing reguirements. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants filed the restrictive covenants, 
limiting all of their land holdings in Cedar Valley to 
agricultural use until compliance with County ordinances. 
Defendant Utah County brought suit against 
Plaintiffs/Appellants in state court asking for injunctions 
and rescision of all contracts of sale entered into by 
plaintiffs with their buyers and asking to have their 
contracts declared void and enjoining them from obtaining 
building permits or selling of their lands. 
Plaintiffs brought this action for injunctive relief, 
and for violation of their civil rights under §1983, by 
governmental action constituting defamation plus damaging 
their interests in property guaranteed under the United States 
_ 9 _ 
Constitution and applicable state law. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The trial Court entered a stay of proceedings pending 
the litigation brought by Utah County against the 
Plaintiffs/Appellants. 
After Utah County had dismissed their state court 
proceeding against Plaintiffs/Appellants, the U.S. District 
Court withdrew the stay of proceedings. 
After a period of discovery. Defendants filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment on all issues. 
On September 7, 1988, the trial court granted summary 
judgment on all issues except the defamation plus damage to an 
interest in property claim which was reserved for a later time. 
On July 25, 1989, the trial court granted the De-
fendants Motion for Summary Judgment on all issues. Judgment 
dismissing all claims of the plaintiffs/appellants was granted 
on August 21, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The plaintiffs have an ownership interest in 
approximately 27,000 acres of land in an area known as Cedar 
Valley in Utah County, State of Utah (Doc. 63 at 3, Defendants 
Memorandum in support of Motion for Summary Judgment) 
2. The subject property in Cedar Valley is unin-
corporated (Doc. 63 at 4). 
3. Defendant Utah County is a political subdivision 
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organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the 
State of Utah (Doc. 63 at 4). 
4. Defendant Jeff Mendenhall is now employed as the 
Planning Director of Utah County and has been so employed 
since April of 1978 (Doc. 63 at 4). 
5. Defendant Gordon Buckley Rose is currently em-
ployed as a planner by Utah County and, has been an employee 
of Utah County at all times mentioned within plaintiffs' 
Complaint (Doc. 63 at 4). 
6. Defendant Iva Snell was employed by Utah County 
at all times mentioned in plaintiffs' Complaint, but has since 
retired (Doc. 63 at 4). 
7. Defendant Keith Richan, previously named as de-
fendant John Doe 1 in Plaintiffs' Designation of John Does, 
was formerly a member of the Board of County Commissioners of 
Utah County. He previously was the Chairman of the Utah 
County Planning Commission. (Doc. 63 at 4 and Doc. 80 Exhibit 
B at 6). 
8. Defendant Jeril Wilson, previously named as de-
fendant John Doe 2 in Plaintiff's Designation of Jon Does, was 
formerly a member of the Board of County Commissioners of Utah 
County (Doc. 63 at 4). 
9. Defendant Lynn W. Davis, previously named as 
defendant John Doe 3 in Plaintiffs' Designation of John Does, 
was a Deputy County Attorney, (Doc. 63 at 5). 
10. On or about December 22, 1978, Utah county 
passed the 1976 Revised Zoning Ordinance of Utah County, Utah 
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(Doc. 63 at 5). 
11. Said ordinance contained a provision requiring 
the filing of a plat for the subdivision of land, §4-3-52, and 
allowed for an exemption from the subdivision plat filing 
requirement upon satisfactory completion of covenants pre-
cluding the residential or non-agricultural use of such land 
until an approved subdivision plat has been recorded, §4-3-53 
(Doc. 63 at 5, Addendum K) . The ordinance was enacted under 
the state enabling statute Section 17-27-27, Utah Code 
Annotated as amended (Addendum J). 
12. The Monte Vista parcel, approximately 9,000 
acres, was purchased on May 18, 1978 from Wallace Ohran, who 
had purchased the property from the Cooperative Security 
Corporation . Lee Fitzgerald's family purchased the stock in 
Monte Vista Ranch Corporation. (Deposition of Leland A. 
Fitzgerald, taken May 14. 1987. pp. 7-8, Doc. 63 at 6). 
13. The McKinney Land, approximately 12,940 acres, 
was purchased from the McKinneys on January 31, 1977. It was 
Leland Fitzgerald's intent to ranch a portion of the parcel 
and sell part of it (Deposition of Leland A. Fitzgerald taken 
May 14, 1987, p. 50, Doc. 63 at 6). 
14. The DuPratt land, approximately 5,000 acres, was 
purchased by Leland Fitzgerald on contract from James DuPratt 
in September, 1977. (Deposition of Leland A. fitzgerald taken 
May 14, 1987, p. 89, Doc. 63 at 6). 
15. The Nichols parcel, approximately 920 acres, was 
purchased from Eldred Nichols on March 19, 1979 (Deposition of 
-5-
Leland A. Fitzgerald taken May 14, 1987, pp. 100-101, Doc. 63 
at 6) . 
16. The Stewart parcel, approximately 53 acres, was 
purchased on October 11, 1978 from Robert Stewart (Deposition 
of Leland A. Fitzgerald taken May 14, 1987, p. 105, Doc. 63 at 
7). 
17. The subject parcels lie partially or entirely 
within the Mining and Grazing 1 (M&G-l), Rural Residential 5 
(RR5), and Agricultural 1 (A01) zones (Doc. 63 at 7). 
18. County government and county employees and 
officials (the Planning Commission and the County Commission) 
were in a state of confusion in their own minds as to the 
method and means by which to implement both the state statute 
and the county ordinance. (Deposition of Iva Snell, 
Affidavit of Walter and Printess Fitzgerald, Doc. 80 Exhibit 
F, Addendum B). 
19. After purchasing the properties in Cedar Valley, 
Fitzgeralds developed the properties by clearing weeds from a 
dust bowl, leveling land, and placing 600 acres under cul-
tivation. (Doc. 80 Exhibit B paragraph 7, Addendum A). 
20. They drilled wells producing 87° hot water, made 
the land more productive, and developed water for both 
culinary and irrigation purposes (Doc. 80, Exhibit B, 
paragraph 8, Addendum A). 
21. Fitzgerald put more than $1,000,000 into im-
provements in the Cedar Valley project, including three new 
high-capacity wells (two sixteen-inch wells and one eight-inch 
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well) with the capacity of producing 20 second feet or 
approximately 9,000 gallons, per minute, sufficient to 
irrigate over 1,500 acres of Cedar Valley farmland. Other 
improvements included four water storage tanks, several miles 
of culinary pipeline, the beginning of a community park, con-
structing and graveling roads, and improving several hundred 
acres of dust bowl-quality land by planting crops (Doc. 80, 
Exhibit B, paragraph 10, Addendum A). 
22. Combining with numerous people, the Fitzgeralds 
attempted to form an agricultural community (Doc. 80, Exhibit 
B, paragraph 9, Addendum A), 
23. Before he started selling any of the farmland in 
Cedar Valley, Leland A. Fitzgerald went to the State of Utah 
to find out what was necessary to comply with the Land Sales 
Practices Act. They gave him papers to outline what was 
necessary to comply with the Act, and that outline included a 
requirement to comply with County zoning ordinances. As a 
result of that, he went to the County to try to comply with 
the County's zoning ordinances for the purpose of selling land 
only. His intent was to sell agricultural land in blocks and 
quantities of sufficient size to meet the needs of potential 
buyers (Doc. 80, Exhibit B Paragraph 24, Addendum A). 
24. Thereafter, he went back to the State and told 
them that he was going to sell some agricultural tracts. They 
informed him that they were not interested in matters per-
taining to the sale of agricultural tracts, and that that was 
not covered by the Land Sales Practices Act because it was 
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specifically exempted from the requirements (Doc. 80, Exhibit 
B, paragraph 25, Addendum A). 
25. The Fitzgeralds complied with all the ordinances 
and statutory requirements and all reasonable requests of the 
county (Doc. 80, Exhibit B, paragraph 12- 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 
24, 25. 27. 28. 30. 32. 33. 34. Addendum A). 
26. The county falsified the minutes of the planning 
commission meetings with the Fitzgeralds pertaining to their 
proposed community plans and used such falsified minutes as 
the springboard for the defamation of Fitzgeralds as "illegal 
developers" (Doc. 80, Exhibit B, paragraph 12-22, Addendum A). 
27. Fitzgerald made numerous efforts to comply with 
county ordinances on a waiver of plat filing requirements 
under exemption of state statute and county ordinance (Doc. 
80, Exhibit B, paragraph 27-34, Addendum A). 
28. Fitzgeralds signed, filed, and recorded 
restrictive covenants on all the land to be sold on forms 
provided by Utah County restricting all of the land to 
agricultural non-residential use (Doc. 80, Exhibit B. 
paragraph 27-34, Doc. 80, Exhibit B(l) and F(8), Addendum H & 
I). 
29. Plaintiffs entered into a contract to sell Boyd 
Corbett and Keith Gurr several thousand acres of land in Cedar 
Valley (Doc. 80, Exhibit B, paragraph 26, Addendum A). 
30. Corbett and Gurr came to Fitzgerald requesting 
him to sign an agricultural waiver and recorded covenants 
restricting the use of the land to agricultural purposes until 
a subdivision plat was filed, so that they could sell their 
land to their buyers (Doc. 80, Exhibit B, paragraph 27, 
Addendum A). 
31. Corbett and Gurr and Fitzgerald signed the 
restrictive covenants in the County offices (Doc. 80, Ehxibit 
B, paragraph 27, Addendum A). 
32. Sometime later, the County Planning office 
notified them that they would have to have Richard McKinney 
sign the restrictive covenants limiting the property to 
agricultural useage. Fiztgerald approached Mr. McKinney and 
he objected to one of the paragraphs in the restrictive 
covenants provided to us by Utah County. Eventually, Mr. 
McKinney and Fitzgerald were referred to the Deputy County 
Attorney, Richard Dalebout. He informed them that they would 
take out the objectionable paragraphs and that it could then 
be processed and the agricultural waiver issued. When they 
returned to the office, Mr. McKinney wanted to discuss 
privately with Fitzgerald a matter, and asked to renegotiate 
the contract under which he was purchasing the McKinney 
properties, for a substantially larger price. Fitzgerald 
would not renegotiate the contract, and Mr. McKinney refused 
to sign the agricultural waiver as a result (Doc. 80, Exhibit 
B, paragraph 27, Addendum A). 
33. In their efforts to get the approvals of the 
County at a subsequent time, Fitzgerald and Corbett and Gurr 
submitted restrictive covenants to the County on the County's 
forms which had been notarized at Valley Title (Doc 80, 
Exhibit B, paragraph 29, Addendum A). 
34. They presented them to Iva Snell. The County 
again insisted that they should obtain the signature of 
Richard McKinney, since they knew that he would not sign the 
restrictive covenants. Fitzgerald informed them that he was 
the owner of the land and that they had his signature and 
those of Corbett and Gurr, who were the new buyers of the 
land, and that they were going to record the restrictive 
covenants. Iva Snell informed him that if he recorded the 
restrictive covenants, the County would bring a lawsuit 
against him (Doc. 80, Exhibit B, paragraph 25-30, Addendum A). 
35. At a later time, Walter Fitzgerald requested 
that Leland Fitzgerald go with him to place restrictive 
covenants on the land to limit it to agricultural useage so 
that he might obtain a waiver allowing his buyer, Printess 
Fitzgerald, to sell some of that land because Utah County had 
a new employee, Nick Zullo, who would work with them. Nick 
Zullo said that he would work with them if they would get the 
signatures of as many of the owners as they could. Fitzgerald 
obtained the signatures of Sterling Sill, T.H. Bell, Walter 
Fitzgerald, Nephi Fitzgerald, Kent Angel, Noal Batemen, and 
Jim Hillner. They took the restrictive covenants to Nick 
Zullo. Zullo said he was surprised they could get everybody's 
signature, but that they now had what was required and the 
waiver was approved (Doc. 80, Exhibit B, paragraph 32, 
Addendum A). 
36. Zullo told Leland Fitzgerald to record the 
restrictive covenants with the Utah County Recorder, and he 
did so. Later, Leland received a letter from Iva Snell 
informing him that the application for agricultural waiver had 
been denied, even though he had seen Nick Zullo sign the 
approval (Doc, 80, Exhibit B, paragraph 32, Addendum A). 
37. On another occasion, Fitzgerald decided to 
proceed with an agricultural waiver on the DuPratt property. 
He went in to get the restrictive covenants from the county. 
Mr. DuPratt, agreed to sign the restrictive covenants. Iva 
Snell told him that he could not proceed on the DuPratt 
properties with an agricultural waiver until he proceeded with 
the McKinney properties. She told him she would not approve a 
non-agricultural waiver on the DuPratt land until he had 
McKinney1s signature. (Doc. 80, Exhibit B, paragraph 33, 
Addendum A). 
38. As a result of that refusal, he decided he would 
proceed on the Monte Vista Ranch properties. He went to the 
Planning office and was told by Iva Snell that he could not 
proceed on Monte Vista Ranch because he had to have the 
McKinney properties and the Dupratt properties approved 
first. She told him that in order to approve the Monte Vista 
Ranch properties, he would have to have the signature on the 
restrictive covenants of the Cooperative Security Corporation, 
which had been the seller to the Ohran group, who then formed 
Monte Vista Ranch. She also said she was going to reguire 
that the former stockholders of the Monte Vista Ranch sign the 
restrictive covenants. He argued with her that they were only 
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stockholders in the corporation and that the corporation owned 
the land, but she refused to let him process the applicaton 
for nonagricultural waiver unless he secured the signature of 
the former stockholders of the corporation as well as the 
seller of the land, the Cooperative Security Corporation. He 
went to the Ohran people, and they refused to sign it, saying 
that they were not the owners of the land, that it was owned 
by the corporation. Iva Snell sent him a letter, telling him 
that they rejected the application of Monte Vista Ranch, even 
though it was the titled owner of the land (Doc. 80, Exhibit 
B, paragraph 34, Addendum A). 
39. The county and the individually named defendants 
launched a series of newspaper articles in which they made 
references to unnamed persons characterized as "land 
developers" in Cedar Valley carrying out a multitude of 
illegal transactions. The articles were obviously aimed at 
plaintiffs (Doc. 80, Exhibit B, paragraph 35, Addendum A). 
40. The articles referred to 374 "defendants" who 
had allegedly violated County ordinances and the State Land 
Sales Practices Act (Doc. 80, Exhibit B, paragraph 36, 
Addendum A). 
41. On deposition, Buckley Rose said he did not know 
where the number of 374 had been obtained by the Daily 
Herald. When the deposition of Dawn Tracy, the reporter from 
the Daily Herald, was taken, she produced at that deposition a 
list of persons which included buyers and seller of land in 
Cedar Valley, as well as owners of land in Cedar Valley who 
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had neither bought nor sold land for more than 50 years. The 
designation at the top of that list was "374 defendants" (Doc. 
80, Exhibit B, paragraph 38, Addendum A), 
42. At the time Utah County brought the lawsuit 
against Fitzgerald and others, the reguest for suit was 
prepared by Gordon Buckley Rose and signed by Jeff Mendenhall, 
and approved by Keith Richan, Jeril Wilson, and the County 
Commission, as indicated in their depositions. Buckley Rose 
denied knowledge of the origin of the list of 374 defendants. 
When it was revealed by the deposition of Dawn Tracy, the list 
itself was shown to be in the handwriting of Buckley Rose. He 
had placed the designation "374 Defendants" on that list (Doc. 
80, Exhibit B, Paragraph 39, Addendum A). 
43. At the time of the reguest for suit against the 
defendants was submitted to the Utah County Attorney's Office, 
that list was attached to the reguest. At the time plaintiffs 
reguested Utah County to furnish copies of the documents 
pertaining to the lawsuit, the reguest for litigation was 
provided, but the itemization of the 374 defendants had been 
removed and was not produced until the deposition of Dawn 
Tracy (Doc. 80, Exhibit B, paragraph 40, Addendum A). 
44. Leland Fitzgerald was present when that list was 
produced by Dawn Tracy, who testified that it was obtained 
from a former employee of the Utah County Planning Department 
(Doc. 80, Exhibit B, paragraph 41, Addendum A). 
45. The admissions on deposition by Jeril Wilson and 
Lynn Davis that they did not look at any of the individual 
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transactions before they filed the lawsuit against Fitzgerald 
demonstrates that the combined efforts of Keith Richan, Lynn 
Davis. Jeril Wilson. Jeff Mendenhall. Iva Snell. and Buckley 
Rose were a conspiracy to destroy Fitzgerald without even 
verifying the transactions reported by Buckley Rose (Doc. 80. 
Exhibit B, paragraph 38-42, Addendum A). 
46. The references by the County Commissioners, Lynn 
Davis, and the other Planning personnel to the "land scam" and 
"illegal sales" of land in Cedar Valley, the alleged sale of 
land to which the sellers could not deliver title, all was 
calculated and in fact resulted in the complete destruction of 
the potential market and value of Fitzgeralds' land in Cedar 
Valley (Doc. 80, Exhibit B, paragraph 44, Addendum A). 
47. The actions of the County not only destroyed the 
market for future sales, but destroyed many sales of valid and 
enforceable contracts by causing the buyers to refuse to go 
forward with their contracts because of the representations of 
the County that they were victims of a "land scam" (Doc. 80, 
Exhibit B, paragraph 45, Addendum A). 
48. Keith Richan personally appeared on television 
and badmouthed Leland Fitzgerald. He used words such as land 
scam," "illegal subdivision," etc. (Doc. 80, Exhibit B, 
paragraph 46, Addendum A). 
49. In March, 1983, Utah County brought a lawsuit 
against appellants, asking for injunctions prohibiting sales, 
abatement of sales, prohibiting obtaining of building permits, 
voiding all prior sales, and asking for attorneys fees and 
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costs (Doc. 80, Exhibit B (6), Addendum F). 
50. In connection with the lawsuit Utah County filed 
a lis pendens on all of appellants lands in Cedar Valley (Doc. 
80, Exhibit B (7), Addendum G). 
51. The County brought the suit against Leland 
Fitzgerald and other parties for simply buying and selling 
land. At a later time, Utah County dismissed their complaint 
against Fitzgeralds in the State Court (Doc. 80, Exhibit B 
(8), Addendum L). 
52. The lawsuit was filed after the Fitzgeralds had 
put more than 29,500 acres under restrictive covenants 
restricting the land from being used except for agriculture 
purposes (Doc. 80, Exhibit B, paragraph 51, Addendum A). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This appeal is from the trial court grant of 
defendants Motion for Summary Judgment on all issues. As 
such, the standard of review is that it must be viewed in a 
light most favorable to the appellants. Poller v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc., (1962) 368 U.S. 464, 7 L.Ed 2d 458. 
82 S. Ct 486, 5 FR Serv 2d 886. This court must consider 
factual inferences tending to show triable issues in a light 
most favorable to the existence of such issues, Redhouse v. 
Quality Ford Sales, Inc., (1975 , CA 10 Utah) 511 F2d 230, 19 





PLAINTIFFS' FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS ARE SUFFICIENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW TO REQUIRE FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS 
BY THE JURY 
A. The applicable statutes and ordinances in question 
exceed the state's police power and are therefore 
constitutionally invalid. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has adopted the following 
approach in determining which deprivations occur "without due 
process of law therefore establishing a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment 
The existence of an adequate state remedy to 
redress property damage inflicted by state 
officers avoided the conclusion that there 
has been any constitutional deprivation of 
property without due process of law within 
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment". 
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 at 542 (1981) (citing Bonner 
v. Couqhlin, 517 F.2d 1311f 1319 (7th Cir. 1975)). 
Moreover, "the burden is on plaintiffs to establish 
that the ordinances are arbitrary or capricious, having no 
substantial relationship to promoting the safety, order, 
prosperity and general welfare of the community". South 
Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir.) (en 
banc), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 837 (1974). Violation of a 
procedural due process right requires allegations that a 
person acting under color of state law deprived a party of a 
protected property interest and that the state procedures 
available for challenging the alleged deprivation do not 
satisfy procedural due process requirements. Paratt v. 
Taylor, supra. 
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"Constitutional guarantees may be adequately 
satisfied when a state provides a meaningful post-deprivation 
process, and state action may not be complete "unless or until 
the state fails to provide an adequate post-deprivation remedy 
for the property loss." Williamson County Regional Planning 
Comm'n v, Hamilton Bank, 413 U.S. 172, 87 L.Ed.2d 126, 105 
S.Ct. 3108, 3121 (1985) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 
517, 532, n.12 (1984)). Further, maximum deference should be 
given to the local zoning authority in confronting emerging 
land use issues. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); 
Euclid v. Ambler Reality Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).. 
As such, the State Legislature in Utah Code 
Annotated, 17-27-27, 1953 as amended, granted the County's 
power to control growth within their borders and in 
unincorporated lands by requiring that all proposals to 
subdivide new territory for 'residential purposes' be 
submitted to the County governments for approval. However, 
the Legislature concurrently withheld authority to deny the 
sale of land for agricultural, manufacturing, industrial or 
commercial uses. 
The pertinent part of the Statute states as follows: 
"Subdivision" means the division of a tract, 
or lot or parcel of land into three or more 
lots, plats, sites or other divisions of 
land for the purpose, whether immediate or 
future of sale or building development; 
provided, that this definition shall not 
include a bona fide division or partition of 
agricultural land for agricultural purposes 
or of commercial manufacturing or industrial 
land for commercial, manufacturing or 
industrial purposes (emphasis added). 
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This Statute effectively bars counties from reguiring 
subdivision approval for the enumerated exceptions. Indeed, 
the Legislative history of the Statute shows a conscious 
effort by the Legislature, to provide a specific, unambiguous 
exception to withhold authority from the counties to interfere 
with property rights to sell land for agricultural, 
commercial, manufacturing or industrial purposes. 
Utah County exceeded the express limitations of this 
Statute by enacting Section 4-3-53 , Addendum K, of the 1976 
Revised Zoning Ordinances of Utah County, which reguires land 
owners to secure an approval by the county of a waiver of the 
plat filing reguirements for dividing or sale of land. The 
provision is commonly referred to as the "Agricultural Waiver 
Provisions". This ordinance prohibits sale of any land 
without county approval and the recording of restrictive 
covenants prohibiting the nonaqricultural use of the land. 
The Utah Statute expressly denied the county's 
authority to create such an ordinance and, in fact, carved out 
an entitlement for property owners to sell their property for 
agricultural, industrial, manufacturing or commercial purposes 
without subdivision approval from the County. The Plaintiffs' 
federal constitutional right to alienate their property for 
agricultural or other nonresidential uses, which right was 
preserved by the State Statute, could not be taken away by 
this arbitrary restriction of sale provision in the Utah 
County Zoning Ordinance. 
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The evidence before the trial court demonstrated that 
the Fitzgeralds1 sales were agricultural sales (by the 
affidavit of Leland A. Fitzgerald (Doc. 80 Exhibit B at page 7 
par 24, Addendum A), and the affidavit of Leland A. Fitzgerald 
(Doc. 93, Addendum C), which show that the parcels sold were 
large tracts: 
Johnson 320 acres $224,000. 
Whipple 720 acres $216,000. 
Heaps 160 acres $112,000. 
Curley 400 acres $280,000. 
Dale Jones 960 acres $591,360. 
Stevens Anderson 320 acres 56,000. 
Michael Fitzgerald 160 acres $64,000. 
Paul Fitzgerald 160 acres $64,000. 
Maxwell 160 acres $112,000. 
Hall 1840 acres $295,327. 
Corbett and Gurr 2629.16 acres $466,675. 
The Plaintiffs in this case did not challenge Utah 
county's general zoning plan nor its right to enact valid land 
use ordinances, but instead challenged the County's exercise 
of authority in restricting the sale of land by prohibiting 
any sale of nonresidential land without obtaining County 
approval of the agricultural waiver and further requiring 
filing of restrictive covenants. The plaintiffs assert that 
the County has exceeded its authority; first by passing the 
unconstitutional ordinance, second by arbitrarily and 
discriminatorily applying it. 
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Furthermore, the plaintiffs allege that the ordinance 
bears no reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental 
objective. 
The defendants cited the trial court to 
Crestview-Holliday Homeowners Association v. Enqh Floral 
Company 545 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Utah 1976), to support their 
contention that the role of the judiciary is extremely limited 
in scope when reviewing the legality of ordinances applied to 
specific parcels of property. However, the Homeowners 
Association in Crestview challenged a rezoning classification 
granted to Engh Floral. The association did not contend that 
the County Commissioners had exceeded their authority or that 
it had applied the zoning ordinance in an arbitrary or 
discriminatory manner, but challenged it as spot zoning. 
Hence, the case is readily distinguishable from the 
Plaintiff's claim of unconstitutionality in the present case. 
On the other hand, considerable authority holds that 
local governmental decisions on proposed subdivision plats or 
similar approvals are adjudicatory and must be construed 
pursuant to principals of procedural due process. In Horn v. 
County of Ventura 596 P.2d 1134. 1138 (Cal 1979), the 
California Supreme Court held: 
Subdivision approvals, like variances and 
conditional use permits, involve the 
applicaton of general standards to specific 
parcels of real property. Such governmental 
conduct, affecting the relatively few, is 
"determined by facts peculiar to the 
individual case" and are "adjudicatory11 in 
nature (emphasis added). 
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In Thurston v. Cache Valley 626 P.2d 440 (Utah. 
1981), the Utah Supreme Court upheld Cache County's denial of 
a conditional use permit, but only upon finding that the 
County's ordinance deliniated specific and extensive standards 
and procedures that insured that the Commissioners had not 
arbitrarily exercised their adjudicatory powers and provided 
that the applicant's proprietary rights were protected by 
sufficient due process. 
As a adjudicatory process, the County's application 
of its ordinances must afford the Plaintiff the essentials of 
due process. These essentials include: 1. An adequate 
hearing, 2. Reasonable notice, 3. Articulated standards for 
decision, and 4. Express findings supported by substantial 
evidence. Horn v. County of Ventura, supra; and Hamlin v. 
Matarrozzo, 293 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1972). 
The Utah County Ordinance, Section 4-3-53 requires 
land owners wishing to avoid subdivision plat filing 
requirements to not only record restrictive covenants, but 
also to apply for approval of agricultural waivers. The 
ordinance is unconstitutional on its face because it requires 
County approval of a waiver for those categories already 
exempted from plat filing requirements under the State 
Statute. Moreover, it is vague and ambiguous and violates the 
due process requirement that such ordinances be applied 
following articulated standards for decision. 
The county ordinance articulates no standards for the 
granting or denying of the application for the waiver of plat 
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filing reguirements. The facts showed the county had no such 
standards and was arbitrarily applied. 
While it is reasonable to endow local zoning boards 
with grants of authority to ensure that land development 
advances in a harmonious manner, it is unjustified to grant 
them unlimited authority to exceed a state statute already 
restricting land development. Municipal governments should 
not be allowed to enact vague ordinances that can be easily 
manipulated to discriminate against land owners to satisfy 
whatever whim or fancy is presently in vogue among County 
officials. Allowing such, promotes confusion and unnecessary 
litigation in the County. 
Since the enactment of Section 4-3-53 (Utah County 
Ordinances), there have been numerous applications for waiver 
of plat filing requirements from land owners in Cedar Valley. 
Those applications agreed to impose and record the restrictive 
covenants required by Utah County, but were nevertheless 
denied approval (Affidavit of J. Walter and Printess K. 
Fitzgerald). Exhibit F (1 through 15) (Doc. 80, Exhibit F, 
Addendum C). 
The Fitzgeralds went to the County desiring to comply 
with the ordinance, they were, over a period of several years, 
given the run-around with changing interpretations and 
misdirections. First, they found that there were no set 
standards deliniating the requirements to obtain agricultural 
waivers. In fact, the County had no conception of what 
amounted to a satisfactory completion of the application for 
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waiver by an applicant. Then, after following a series of 
misleading instructions, they found their waivers at first 
granted and then denied after substantial reliance thereon. 
In essence, the waivers were no more than a smoke screen that 
granted the planning commission, through their planning staff, 
unlimited discretion to deny any alienation of the Plaintiffs* 
property (Affidavit of Lee A. Fitzgerald, Doc. 80, Exhibit B, 
Addendum A). 
Not only was the approval arbitrarily denied, but 
where they had granted waiver approval to J. Walter and 
Printess K. Fitzgerald (purchasers through 
plaintiffs/appellants), the county subsequently withdrew such 
approval. The conditions pursuant thereto bear no relation to 
the advancement of the public's general welfare. 
B. The Utah County Board of Adjustment 
Does not have the Authority to Review the 
Subject Matter of this suit 
The trial court inferentially ruled that the 
plaintiffs had adequate state remedies through an appeal to 
the Board of Adjustment. 
The Utah Courts have ruled that exhaustion of 
administrative remedies is unnecessary when such action would 
serve no useful purpose, be futile, or when it appears that 
the administrative body or persons have acted in excess of 
their powers, or acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and in abuse 
of their discretion. See Johnson v. Utah State Retirement 
Agency, 621 P.2d 1234 (1980); Central Bank & Trust Company vs. 
Brimhall, 497 P.2d 638 (Utah 1972); Walker Bank & Trust v. 
Taylor, 390 P.2d 592 (Utah, 1964). 
In the present litigation, the Utah County Ordinance 
does not grant the Utah County Board of Adjustment the 
authority to review decisions pertaining to subdividing 
approvals and agricultural waivers, sales, or the reguired 
imposition of recorded restrictive covenants. 
The 1976 Revised Zoning Ordinance of Utah County, 
Section 4-7-13, grants to the Board of Adjustment the 
following powers and duties: 
The powers and duties of the Board of 
Adjustment shall be limited to the following: 
A. To hear and decide appeals concerning 
errors of interpretation reportedly made by 
a zoning administrator. 
B. To hear and decide appeals concerning 
the interpretation of the zone map. 
C. To hear and decide appeals from special 
exceptions specifically authorized in this 
ordinance. 
D. to hear and decide appeals for variances. 
The Plaintiffs' claim does not allege any errors of 
interpretation, any errors concerning the zoning map, and have 
not reguested special exceptions or for variances. There is 
no provision in the Board of Adjustment ordinance of Utah 
County, giving authority to the board to decide the basis upon 
which approval of the waiver of the plat filing requirements 
must be made. 
Plaintiffs were making sales of agricultural land 
exempted under the State statute. The County ordinance 
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imposed the restriction that plaintiffs needed the approval of 
the county before plaintiffs could make such sales. 
Plaintiffs' challenge is to the constitutionality of such 
ordinance. The Board of Adjustment has no adjudicatory power 
to hold that the County ordinance is unconstitutional or to 
hold in addition that such ordinance is beyond the enabling 
legislation granted to the counties by the state of Utah. 
The plaintiffs were not applying for subdivision 
approval, they were not applying for building permits, but 
were trying to sell a part of their land to meet their 
contractural commitments. There is no remedy under the State 
law or under the County ordinances to redress the wrongs 
committed against the plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs have alleged that Utah County, as an 
entity and its individual officers, have unconstitutionally 
abused their discretion. The Board of Adjustment has no 
authority to rule on this issue. 
The plaintiffs do not seek an exemption from the 
applicable land use law, but pray that the agricultural waiver 
provision be ruled unconstitutional or that, in the 
alternative, it be found that there are fact issues on whether 
it was unconstitutionally applied. 
C. Denial of approval of the waiver of plat filing 
requirments does not provide Judicial Review 
since under state law all governmental entities 
could be immune from suit 
The Defendants argument that administrative remedies 
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were not exhausted should have failed at the trial court level 
since their are substantial constitutional issues present in 
this case. Plaintiffs have already argued that an appeal to 
the Board of Adjustment would be futile since it lacks 
jurisdiction, it cannot rule on whether the individual 
defendants are liable for damages, and it could not obviate 
the constitutional issues raised in this case by any decision 
for or against plaintiff. Of vital significance, however, is 
the fact that under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 63-30-10, 
government entities would be immune from suit, thus further 
making futile the requirement for exhausting judicial or 
administrative remedies. 
Utah Code Annotated 63-30-10 provides in pertinent 
part: 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity - Injury 
caused by negligent act or omission of 
employee-Exceptions-Immunity from suit of 
all governmental entities is waived for 
injury proximately caused by negligent act 
of omission of an employee committed within 
the scope of his employment, except if the 
injury: 
1. arises out of the exercise or 
performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function, whether or 
not the discretion is abused, or 
2. arises out of ...malicious 
prosecution, . . . abuse of process, 
interference with contract rights, ... o,r 
civil rights, or 
3. arises out of the issuance, denial, 
suspension, or revocation of, or by the 
failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend 
or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order, or similar authorization, 
or . . . 
-26-
However, in Monell v. New York City Department of 
Social Services, 436 U.S. 65, 691 (1978), the United Sates 
Supreme Court held that the remedial language of Section 1983 
has been contrued to provide a cause of acton against local 
governments for "constitutional deprivations visited pursuant 
to government custom even though such a custom has not 
received formal approval through the body's official decision 
making channels...". Monell further held that a state cannot 
immunize itself from acts which are a violation of the 
constitutional protections and are addressible under the civil 
rights act. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States 
v. Community Bank & Trust Company, 768 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 
1988), emphasized the fact that the language of Section 1983 
"plainly imposes liability on a government that, under color 
of law some official policy, 'causes1 an employee to violate 
another's constitutional rights." Monell, 436 U.S. at 692, 98 
S.Ct. at 2036. Furthermore, the court noted that "although 
the acts or omissions of no one employee may violate an 
individuals constitutional rights, the combined acts or 
omissions of several employees acting under a governmental 
policy or custom may violate an individual's constitutional 
right. 
On page 40 of this memorandum, the two prong test for 
claims arising under Section 1983 is set forth as stated by 
the Gomez V. Toledo 446 U.S. 635, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 614 L.Ed 2d 
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72 (1980) court. As such, there should be very little doubt 
as to whether the issue that (1) the defendants acted under 
color of state law and of (2) whether the defendants deprived 
the plaintiffs of a federal right, either statutory or 
constitutional gives rise to the claims asserted by 
plaintiffs. 
Furthermore, exhaustion of administrative remedies is 
not reguired when, as here, the plaintiff is preoceeding under 
a Federal Civil Rights Statute and protesting unconstitutional 
action by a political unit of the state. See Patsy v. Board 
of Regents, 454 U.S. 813 (1982). 
The Defendants' Motion (which was granted by the 
trial court) states that in order for the plaintiffs' 
constitutional claim to eliminate the need to exhaust 
administrative remedies, the court must find that the property 
interests asserted were legitimate entitlements deprived 
without due process of law. 
As previously set forth. Section 17-27-27, Utah Code 
Annotated, as amended, granted an entitlement to the 
Plaintiffs to alienate their property for commercial, 
manufacturing, industrial or agricultural purpose without 
submitting a subdivision plat, without reguiring county 
approval, and without reguiring recording of restrictive 
covenants. These additional reguirements created by the 
County are in contravention to the state statute reguirements. 
and thus unconstitutionally encroach upon the rights of the 
plaintiffs to alienate their property. 
In addition, these additional reguirements were 
arbitrarily and discriminatorily enforced making compliance 
unduly burdensome and literally impossible for the 
Plaintiffs. Of further import is the fact that giving 
official sanction to the acts of its employees was the county 
filing suit against plaintiffs appellants to enjoin their 
sales and abrogate their contracts. 
The County, claiming otherwise, makes this a fact 
issue subject to proof on trial, and could not, therefore, be 
determined in the abstract on a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
THE DEFAMATION PLUS CONSTITUTIONAL INJURY ISSUE 
As outlined above in the procedural background, the 
defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as to all 
issues in the case on July 15, 1987 with supporting 
memorandum. On September 7, 1988, the trial court granted 
summary judgment on all issues except the defamation plus 
constitutional injury, which was reserved for later 
determination (Doc. 89, Ruling of September 7, 1988 page 16 
and 17, Addendum D). 
In its ruling of July 25, 1989, the trial court 
rendered its decision on the final issue remaining in the case 
(Doc. #97, Addendum E). 
The plaintiffs/appellants contend that property 
rights or interests asserted to have been damaged by 
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defendants are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
that such rights or interests are viable claims under 42 
U.S.C. §1983. 
Property rights have long been recognized as being 
guaranteed under the constitution. The plaintiffs cite the 
court to Washington EX REL, Seattle Title Trust Corp., v. 
Roburg, 36 A.L.R. 654 (1928) which stands for the proposition 
that a person may use their property in the way they wish to 
use it and such use is protected under the constitution. 
Fuentes v. Shevin, 406 U.S. 67, 32 L.Ed.2d 556, holds that 
the Fourteenth Amendment protects uany significant property 
interest. " In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 33 
L.ED.2d 584. the court said: 
This Court has always made clear that the 
property interest protected by procedural 
due process extends well beyond actual 
ownership of real estate, chattels or money. 
In Ritzholz v. City of Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 385, 284 
P.2d 702 (1955), applicable in the instant case, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
Clearly among the rights attendant upon 
ownership and enjoyment of property are the 
rights to exchange, pledge, sell or 
otherwise dispose of it -- rights which must 
be adeguately protected (emphasis added). 
The Court is also cited to Pride Oil Company v. Salt 
Lake County, 13 Utah 2d 183, 370 P.2d 355 (1962) and Redd v. 
Western Savings & Loan Company, 646 P.2d 761 (Utah 1982). All 
advance the concept that the property interests which are 
protected under the constitution include a variety of property 
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interests, such as those which plaintiffs owned at the time of 
the actions for which they brought the suit at bar. 
Although Hall v. Davis. 424 U.S. 693 (1976) ruled 
that defamation of reputation is not in and of itself a 
liberty protected under the constitution, such an injury, when 
coupled with damage to a property interest or a liberty 
protected by the constitution, establishes a §1983 action. 
This is plaintiffs* position in this case, that the 
actions and generated press articles of the defendants defamed 
the plaintiffs and damaged their property interests guaranteed 
under the constitution. 
While there is no federal right to protect business 
or professional reputations per se, when reputation is damaged 
concurrently with a deprivation or impairment of a property 
right, the claim is cognizable under the civil rights act, 
§1983. Marrero v. City of Halech, 625 F.2d 499, 515 (5th Cir. 
1980). 
In its analysis of this defamation plus deprivation 
of liberty or property interest claim, the trial court 
correctly recognized the presumption in favor of the 
non-moving party where at page 4 the court said 
At the summary judgment stage, the court 
must view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the non-movant, and ,f[t]he 
evidence of the non-movant is to be 
believed, and all justifiable inferences are 
to be drawn in his favor.11 Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) 
(citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 
U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)). The court must 
determine whether ,fthe evidence is such that 
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 
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the nonmoving party.11 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 
248. 
The trial court set forth its evaluation of two 
elements of the "defamation plus" claim in the memorandum 
decision at page 5 as follows: 
To succeed on their defamation claim, 
plaintiffs must prove that (1) defendants 
made defamatory statements under color of 
state law, and (2) that defendants1 
statements operated to deprive plaintiff of 
a recognizable liberty or property interest 
without due process of law. 
The trial court made no finding on the sufficiency of 
the defamatory matters submitted in opposition to the motion 
for summary judgment. The trial court addressed the summary 
judgment by assuming that for purposes of the motion, the 
first requirement that defendants made defamatory statements 
under color of state law had been met and considered the 
Motion for Summary Judgment by analysis of the remaining 
second requirement of a defamation plus claim (Doc. 97 at 5. 
Addendum E). 
For purposes of this appeal, this court must view the 
consideration of the motion for summary judgment in a light 
most favorable to the non-moving party, the same as the trial 
court did, and for purpose of reviewing the trial courts grant 
of summary judgment, this court must also, for purpose of 
appeal, assume the sufficiency of the claim of defamation 
because the trial court premised its grant of summary judgment 
on such assumption. 
The trial court then reviewed the decisions of the 
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Courts in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976), Corbitt v. 
Anderson, 778 F.2d 1471, 1474-75 (10th Cir. 1985), and Board 
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 565 (1972) and characterized the 
trial courts interpretation of those cases, and the burden 
necessary for the plaintiffs to maintain an action for 
defamation plus damage to a property interest as follows: 
.it appears that tangible injury other 
than defamation damages must be inflicted by 
the government directly, apart from the 
conseguences flowing from an injury to 
reputation because of the independent 
actions of third parties. 
Although a few courts have interpreted 
Paul v. Davis differently, this court is of 
the opinion that the case stands for the 
proposition that in order to implicate a 
liberty or property interest protected by 
the Constitution, defamation by a state (or 
federal) actor must involve "some tangible 
change of status vis-a-vis the government.11 
Doe v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 
1109 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
(Doc. 97 at 10, Memorandum Decision, 7/25/89, Addendum E). 
The trial court quoted from Corbitt v. Andersen, 
supra, and the trial courts interpretation of the elements 
necessary and went on the say at page 12 "... lending support 
to the proposition that tangible 'injury requires some change 
in plaintiffs status, vis-a-vis the state, rather than an 
injury caused by acts of the third parties acting upon the 
public officials defamatory remarks. In other words, the 
tangible injury resulting from the defamation must involve 
alteration or extiguishment by the state of some right 
previously protected by the state* ". 
The trial court concluded that in the instant case. 
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the plaintiffs were legally as free to alienate their property 
before the defamatory remarks were made as they were 
afterwards (Doc. #97 at 13, Addendum E). 
Apparently in the time lapse between the courts 
initial memorandum decision (Doc. #89) and the courts 
consideration of the defamation plus claim and its memorandum 
decision (Doc. #97) the court lost track of the factual basis 
of part of the plaintiffs claim. In its memorandum decision 
of July 25, 1989, the court said in the last sentence on page 
2, "Plaintiffs did not execute any deed covenants.11 In fact, 
plaintiffs did comply with the county ordinance and execute 
such deed covenants as shown in the Memorandum in Opposition 
to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc 80, Exhibit B (1) & 
(F) 8, Addendum H & I (doc. #80). In the affidavit of 
plaintiff, Leland A. Fitzgerald, Exhibit B, page 9, "We were 
given the application for an agricultural waiver and the forms 
for recording the restrictive covenants limiting the land to 
agricultural usage until subdivision plats had been filed. 
Corbett, Gurr and I signed the restrictive covenants in the 
county offices." 
At page 10, "I, Corbett and Gurr submitted the 
restrictive covenants to the county on the county forms which 
had been notarized at Valley Title", paragraph 29, and his 
affidavit at page 11, wherein he said, referring to Nick 
Zullo. "he told me to go and record the restrictive covenants 
with the Utah County Recorder and I did so". Attached to the 
affidavit is Exhibit B (1) restrictive covenants precluding 
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residential or other non-agricultural use of the land, showing 
the recording information by Leland A. Fitzgerald on 10 
December 1980. 
Appellants contend that the evidence was presented to 
the trial court of the direct involvement of the defendant, 
Utah County, in the deprivation of legally protected property 
interest recognized by the State of Utah in Ritzholz v. City 
of Salt Lake, supra. 
The defendant, Utah County, the governmental entity 
acting through its agents, employees and attorneys, were not 
content with the damage caused by the defamation of the 
plaintiffs as alleged in the complaint on file herein and in 
the plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment (Doc. 80), but the defendant Utah County 
became the prime actor in depriving the plaintiffs of their 
consitutionally protected rights to the use, exchange or 
selling of their properties by commencing a law suit in the 
State Court against the plaintiffs. A copy of that complaint 
was submitted to the trial court attached to the Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 80, Exhibit 
B(6)l, and is attached to this brief as Addendum F). 
That lawsuit was not a criminal misdemeanor 
proceeding, but was a civil suit brought by Utah County, 
wherein plaintiffs herein, Leland A. Fitzgerald and Helen S. 
Fitzgerald were named defendants along with 25 other 
defendants and 1000 John Does and 1000 Jane Does and sought 
civil remedies as follows: 
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Wherefor plaintiffs demand judgment as 
follows: 
1. That defendants be immediately 
enjoined from disposing of any interest in 
the subject property as described in 
paragraph No. "6" of plaintiffs' first Cause 
of Action. 
2. That defendants be permanently 
enjoined from any further sales, transfers 
and/or divisions of any parcels except in 
parcels as initially acquired by defendants. 
Leland A. Fitzgerald and Monte Vista Ranch 
Corporation. 
3. That all subdivisions and/or past 
sales in subject property be enjoined, 
rescinded and abated. 
4. That the defendants be enjoined from 
obtaining any building permits and/or 
occupancy permits on the subject property 
and that defendants further be enjoined from 
the construction on the property for 
residential purposes. 
5. That upon the rescission of the 
subdivision that defendants be ordered to 
reimburse all purchasers, pursuant to 
Section 57-11-17, Utah Code Annotated, 
(1953), as amended. 
6. That any stipulation or provisions 
contractural or otherwise, purporting to 
bind any person acquiring subdivided lands 
to wiave compliance with the "Utah unoform 
Land Sales Practices Act or a rule or order 
adopted under it, be declared void ab initio. 
7. That the defendants be ordered to pay 
plaintiffs reasonable attorney fees and all 
other court costs associated with this case 
as the court deems necessary. 
8. For such further relief as the Court 
deems necessary and appropriate in the 
premises. 
Dated this 9th day of March, 1982 
(emphasis added). 
That complaint was signed by Gordon Buckley Rose, 
Utah County Planning Commission staff, and Lynn W. Davis, 
Deputy Utah County Attorney. The remedies sought there were 
rescision of all of these plaintiffs contracts, injunctive 
relief, preventing all sales of properties by them. 
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declaration that all of the contractural stipulations and 
agreements be void ab initio, and asking for court costs and 
attorneys fees in favor of Utah County. 
The characterization by the trial court that despite 
the defamatory acts by the defendant Utah County through its 
employees and agents, that the plaintiffs in this proceeding 
were as free to alienate their property before and after the 
defamatory press coverage outlined in the Memorandum in 
Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment ignored the 
direct involvement of Utah County in destroying the 
contractural relationshps of the plaintiffs herein with their 
buyers. 
At the filing of the lawsuit, the defendant Utah 
County also filed a lis pendens clouding title on 76 sections 
of ground comprising more than 48,000 acres (Doc. 80 Exhibit 
B(7), Addendum G). 
Lis pendens literally means a pending suit. A lis 
pendens arises when a party to litigation wishes to protect 
his ownership interest against later claimants in a suit over 
the question of ownership of land. Burby, Handbook of the Law 
of Real Property (1965), p. 334. 
Under Utah law, lis pendens has been codified in 
§78-40-2 U.C.A. (1953). The statute provides in part. 
In any action affecting the title to, or the 
right of possession of, real property the 
plaintiff at time of filing of complaint or 
thereafter . . . may file for record with 
the recorder of the county in which the 
property or some part thereof is situated a 
notice of pendency of the action, containing 
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names of the parties, etc. . . . (emphasis 
added) . 
The common law and the statutory law as written are aimed at 
giving notice to third parties that the title to property is 
in question and the rights of a subsequent purchaser of that 
property will be subject to the outcome of the suit. 
In the instant case, Utah County, through its agents, 
filed a suit pertaining to sales of land in Cedar Valley, the 
premise being that the named defendants were violating, or had 
violated, the county's zoning ordinances and State Land Sales 
Practices Act. 
The complaint does not make claims that the 
plaintiffs1 title to the property was in doubt, or that they 
had incurred unsatisfied tax obligations which were being 
satisfied by levying against the property. The focus of the 
county's complaint was that the activities of those named 
might somehow be in violation of state and county law. No 
claim was made in the suit disparaging to the title to 
plaintiffs' property. The claims filed by the County were 
later dismissed (Doc. 80, Exhibit B (8), Addendum L). 
Plaintiffs contend that the county violated their 
rights to possess and exercise dominion and control over their 
property interests by filing the lis pendens, and that such 
action gave rise to a cause of action against the county and 
its officers. 
Birch v. Fuller, 9 Utah 2d 79, 337 P.2d 964 (1959), 
allowed the filing of a damage claim where a lis pendens was 
filed that was not in accordance with §78-40-2, U.C.A 1953, 
and did not constitute a republication of pleadings. 
In the instant case, although Utah County filed a 
lawsuit, the action did not pertain to a question of title, or 
right of possession of real property, but rather was aimed at 
adjudicating the issue of whether sales and marketing of the 
land was in accordance with county ordinances and/or state 
law. 
Therefore. if the actions of the county and its 
agents were not privileged or immunized, then plaintiffs 
should have the opportunity to establish their proof that the 
wrongful filing of the lis pendens created a slander of title 
or defamation of their property interests, and should be 
allowed to establish any damages flowing from this action. 
In a companion case now pending before this court, 
Walter Fitzgerald et al v. Utah County, case 88-2384, the U.S. 
Magistrate made a report and recommendation to the trial court 
in that case which was cited by appellees to the trial court 
in this case (Doc. 63 at 9). 
As pointed out by the Magistrate in his Report and 
Recommendation in the companion case (Doc. no 63): 
The filing of a lis pendens is not an 
exclusive governmental act to which the 
Governmental Immunity Act applies. It is 
not a function which can only be performed 
by a governmental entity. [Footnote 17:] 
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 
P.2d 1230 (1980); Johnson v. Salt Lake City, 
629 P.2d 432 (1981); Madsen v. borthick, 658 
P.2d 627 (Utah. 1983). 
Plaintiffs further assert that the slander of title 
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created by filing of the lis pendens is a violation of rights 
in property guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and is thus a 
claim cognizable under 42 U.S. §1983. 
§1983 provides in pertinent part: 
Every person who under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, or 
any state or terrritory, subjects or causes 
to be subjected, any citizen in deprivation 
of any rights . . . secured by the 
constitution and laws shall be liable to the 
party injured. . . 
To state a claim under §1983, the plaintiffs must 
show two things: (1) that the defendants acted under color of 
state law, and (2) that the defendants deprived the plaintiffs 
of a federal right, either statutory or constitutional. Gomez 
v. Toledo, supra. 
Application of this test to plaintiffs' circumstances 
is as follows. 
First, did Utah County and its officers act under 
color of state law? The answer is undoubtedly yes. All of 
the alleged defamation was by the county employees and claimed 
to be acting for the county. In addition, the county's 
agents, relying on state statutes and county ordinances, 
brought suit against the plaintiffs herein, alleging violation 
of state law and county ordinances. As part of that action, 
the county, through its agents, recorded the lis pendens of 
which complaint is made. 
Second, did the defendants' actions deprive the 
plaintiffs of a federal right? The plaintiffs' rightful 
ownership of the property in Cedar Valley was never contested 
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by the county. The county's suit did not rest upon any theory 
that cast a shadow upon the plaintiffs' ownership or 
possession; rather, the suit focused upon the alleged 
noncompliance with state and county laws and ordinances. By 
filing the lis pendens, the county challenged the plaintiffs' 
rightful possession and ownership of the Cedar Valley property. 
The filing of a lis pendens is aimed at giving notice 
of, or republishing the pleadings of a claim or suit being 
brought to establish rightful ownership or possession of 
property. 78-40-2 U.C.A. 1953. "The sole purpose of 
recording a lis pendens is to give constructive notice of the 
pendency of proceedings which may be derogatory to an owner's 
title or right to possession" (Emphasis added) Hidden 
Meadows Development Company v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 
1979) and that the "recording of a lis pendens serves as 
warning to all persons that any rights or interest they may 
acguire in the interim are subject to the judgment or decree" 
Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Co., 579 P.2d 914 (Utah 1978). 
Clearly, the county had no basis to guestion the 
plaintiffs' ownership of the affected land, nor did the county 
express such a claim in its complaint. The plaintiffs contend 
that the county's action denied them their property rights 
protected under the U.S. Constitution, XIV Amendment. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has held that property rights are protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment and violations thereof can be 
addressed by suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Lynch v. Household 
Finance Corp. , 405 U.S. 538, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed 2d 424 
(1972). Also Rios v. Cessna Finance Corp., 488 F. 2d 25 (10th 
Cir. 1973). 
By filing the lis pendens, the county created a cloud 
upon the plaintiffs1 rightful ownership and possession of the 
Cedar Valley property. As a result, plaintiffs' efforts to 
sell its property were greatly impacted. It is self evident 
that the value and/or marketability of property is diminished 
in the eyes of a potential purchaser, when, during a review of 
the potential seller's chain of title, a lis pendens is 
discovered recorded against the seller's interest in the 
property. This is exactly what happened in the plaintiffs' 
case. By recording the lis pendens, the county put the world 
on notice that it was asserting a claim to the title of 
plaintiffs land and therefore deprived the plaintiffs of their 
protected property rights by destroying the value and 
marketability of the property interests of potential buyers. 
The plaintiffs should be granted the opportunity to 
present this evidence and establish proof that this occurred 
and that the plaintiffs should be compensated by the county 
and its officials for this deprivation of property rights. 
In addition to the defamatory remarks, the conduct 
and actions of the county as described in the affidavit of 
Leland A. Fitzgerald and Walter Fitzgerald attached to the 
Memorandum in Opposition for Summary Judgment (Doc. 80, 
Exhibit B, F, and H, Addendum A and B) illustrates that 
Plaintiffs have met the standards required by the trial judge 
to show that there was a change of status vis-a-vis the 
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government and that the "defamation by a state actor must 
involve" some tangible change of status vis-a-vis the 
government. 
Despite their efforts to the contrary and despite the 
recording and filing of the restrictive covenants required by 
the ordinance of Utah County. the ongoing and pervasive 
prevention of compliance with the exemption provided in the 
ordinance of Utah County coupled with the lawsuit filed and 
asking for court orders prohibiting the sale of plaintiffs 
property, established the required nexus between the 
defamation committed by the county and the acts of the county 
in depriving the plaintiffs of their constitutionally and 
statutorily protected rights regarding their property. 
It is not sufficient to say that if the alleged 
claims in the lawsuit filed by Utah County were unsupported by 
adequate foundation that the suit could have been defended. 
Under the state laws the county claims governmental immunity 
pursuant to the reservation of the waiver of immunity granted 
as quoted herein on page 26. As addressed elsewhere herein in 
a 1983 civil rights action, the governmental immunity cannot 
be used as a means of defeating the claim under §1983. Thus 
the damage done to the property of the plaintiffs by the 
conduct described herein; the filing of the lawsuit attacking 
and attempting to abrogate all of plaintiffs contracts, the 
filing of the lis pendens, the refusal to grant approval 
despite the recording of the restrictive covenants in 
compliance with the ordinance of the plaintiffs, all rise to 
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the level of the damaging and desparaging of property 
interest, neccessary to meet the second element of the 
defamation plus claim. 
POINT III 
The actions of Utah County constitute a "Taking" 
under established law 
As previously described, plaintiffs contention is 
that the challenged ordinance is not a land-use planning 
ordinance, it is blatantly a device for controlling the sale 
of land. While property may be regulated to a certain extent, 
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. 
First Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los 
Angeles, 107 S.Ct 2378, 96 L.Ed 2, 265, from Pennsylvania 
Coal Company v. Mahan, 260 U.S. 393, 67 L.Ed 322, 43 S.Ct. 
158, 28 A.L.R. 1321. 
Utah county had in place its regular zoning 
ordinances wherein the property of the plaintiffs was subject 
to zoning as: Mining and Grazing, Rural Residential 5 and 
Agricultural Zone. (Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
docket 63, page 7 at paragraph 21). Those zoning ordinances 
already prohibited the "use" of plaintiff's land except in 
conformity to the zoning ordinances. The provision of the 
county ordinances reguiring the placing of a restrictive 
covenant on the land as a condition of entitlement to the 
exemption already provided for in the State statute as 
discussed elsewhere in this brief is an intrusion that reaches 
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beyond that necessary to accomplish a valid government 
purpose. 
Of even greater significance is the provision of the 
ordinance which required that the obtaining of the 
agricultural waiver application be approved by the county 
before any sales of land could be consummated. This approval 
by the county was required as to land exempted from the plat 
filing requirements, both by the state statute and by the 
county ordinance. As stated in First Lutheran Church v. Los 
Angeles by the United States Supreme court, quoting itself 
from Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company, 13 Wall 166, 167-178-20 
L.Ed 557 (1872) 
It would be a very curious and 
unsatisfactory result if . . . it shall be 
held that if the government refrains from 
the absolute conversion of real property to 
the uses of the public it can destroy its 
value entirely, can inflect irreparable and 
permanent injury to an extent, can, in 
effect, subjected to total destruction 
without making any compensation, because in 
the narrow sense of the word, it is not 
taken for the public use. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in First Lutheran Church further said 
It would require a considerable extension of 
these decisions to say that no compensable 
regulatory taking may occur until a 
challenged ordinance has ultimately been 
held invalid. 
The trial court in this case held that the ordinances 
substantially advanced the legitimate state interest of 
promoting orderly growth and safety measures as well as 
fostering the states agricultural industry. That conclusion 
by the trial court was made without submission of any evidence 
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or even a claim as to the purpose to be served by the 
requirement that the county approve the exemption and the 
waiver of the plat filing requirements before sale of the 
property. 
With the zoning ordinances already in place, the 
restrictions were already of record on the use of the land, 
the restriction in 4-3-53 of the county ordinances reaches 
beyond permissible limits in restricting the right to even 
sell the property without the approval of the county. 
The defendant County takes the position that 
appellants herein, the plaintiffs, did not submit evidence to 
the court negating the purpose of the ordinance and that the 
presumption of the validity carries that burden for the 
county. The presumption of validity of ordinances does not 
deal with the conclusion made by the trial judge that the 
ordinance substantially advanced the legitimate state interest 
as required by the U.S. Supreme Court in First Lutheran Church 
v. Los Angeles County, and as described in Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission, 97 L.Ed 2d 677, 687 107 S.Ct 
381, 481, 55 U.S.L.W. 5154, (1987). There is no basis in the 
opinion nor is there a statement from the ordinance itself 
setting forth what the purpose of the ordinance was to be as 
it relates to the prohibition on sales of property without 
county approval. As such, the ordinance comports with those 
ordinances described in Nollan and First Lutheran Church, 
supra, which go beyond permissible constitutional limits and 
and constitute a taking of the plaintiffs property. 
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The commencement of the lawsuit by Utah County in an 
effort to not only enjoin further sales by the plaintiffs but 
asking the court to rescind all sales, abrogate all sales, and 
declare all sales by them invalid is evidence of the pervasive 
efforts by Utah County which constitute a taking. 
An examination of the restrictive covenants, which 
were provided by Utah County to applicants for waiver of the 
plat filing reqirements, demonstrates that in essence the 
covenants reach beyond the state enabling legislation, in 
that, instead of limiting the useage to agricultural, 
commercial, manufacturing, and industrial purposes, as 
exempted by the enabling legistlation, the County's 
restrictive covenants would limit use to the sole purpose of 
agriculture. Beyond that, the restrictive covenants would 
require that the land not be used for other than agricultural 
purposes until subdivision plats are filed. 
Since the county already had and has ordinances 
setting forth the circumstances and requirements for filing of 
subdivision plats, the restrictive covenants only require that 
the owners of the land comply with County ordinances. Since 
the law requires them to do so anyway, the restrictive 
covenants are of highly dubious value in promoting any orderly 
growth or development of the County. 
The real purpose of the restrictive covenants in the 
scheme established by Utah County is to require that before 
anyone sells land in the County, they must have the approval 
of the County Planning department, which requires the 
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application for a waiver of the plat filing requirement. 
This ordinance requiring approval by the County of 
all sales of land within the County is a direct invasion of 
the plaintiffs' constitutional right to own, hold and alienate 
their property guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 
While it is quite appropriate and within 
constitutional permissibility for the County to pass an 
appropriate ordinance and zoning plan which requires or sets 
forth certain uses and allowable buildings or structures in 
the specified zones, it is quite another thing for the County 
to pass an ordinance providing that no one can sell their land 
unless the County has approved the sale. 
An examination of Lee Fitzgerald's affidavit 
demonstrates that no matter how hard plaintiffs tried to 
comply with the county's ordinances, both as to the filing of 
the restrictive covenants and as to requesting the County's 
approval, the county denied that approval, thus making the 
Fizgeralds unable to sell their land for bona fide 
agricultural purposes (Doc. 8, Exhibit B, Addendum A). 
The combined acts of the county in promoting the 
defamation and the lawsuit brought against the 
plaintiffs/appellants constitutes a regulatory "taking" of and 
an actual taking of the plaintiffs/appellants interests in 




This court is now asked to overturn the Summary 
Judgment granted by the trial court. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants ask this court to rule that the 
ordinances in question are invalid as to the requirement 
requiring Restrictive Covenants to be filed and requiring 
approval of Utah County of the application for waiver of plat 
filing requirements. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants ask this court to hold that 
Summary Judgment was erroneous on the claim of defamation plus 
injury to property. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants also ask this court to hold 
that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the 
issue of an unconstitutional 'taking' both by a regulatory 
taking and an actual deprivation of a property interest. 
Appellants ask this court to reverse the trial court 
on the issues raised in this brief. 
Plaintiffs request oral argument. Page limitations 
prevent a thorough analysis of these complex constitutional 
issues. Appellants believe the Court will want counsel to 
respond as to appellants' position on several points. 
Dated this Jn day of September, 1990. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 




UTAH COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of 
Utah and a governmental entity 
of the State of Utah, JEFF 
MENDENHALL, GORDON BUCKLEY 
ROSE, IVA SNELL, KEITH RICHAN, 
JERIL WILSON, LYNN DAVIS and 
JOHN DOES 4 through 20, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C82-0736G 
The Court previously issued a Memorandum Decision and order 
granting defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on all but one 
claim in the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (September 7, 1988 
Memorandum Decision and Order). The single remaining claim was 
defamation-plus separate constitutional injury cognizable under 
AUG 2 4 1989 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court directed counsel to file 
supplemental briefs and supporting affidavits on this issue. 
The Court has reviewed the memoranda and affidavits 
submitted by the parties and the relevant pleadings in the file 
and has issued its Memorandum Decision and Order granting 
defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment on the S 1983 defamation-
plus claim. It is the judgment of the Court that the plaintiffs 
have failed to establish essential elements of the remaining 
claim, there are no disputes of material fact and defendants are 
therefore entitled to judgment as matter of law. Accordingly, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment on all claims asserted by the 
plaintiffs is granted, with prejudice. Parties will bear their 
own costs and attorney's fees. 
DATED this ^S-yV'^ day of August, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
Les mailed to cnsl 8/23/89mp: 
)ayle Jeffs, Esq. 
xiore E. Kanell, Esq. 
Birmingham, Esq. s J\\P //. A I^A 
f K. Burnett, ESq. By ^^jUi/P^u.^ /CfrQ2>^C 
art B. Hansen. ESQ. J. /Thomas Grteene art B. Hansen, Esq 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Federal District Court Judge 
Dated t h i s /ff ^ttay of August, 1989 
^/^w? 
Plaintiff's Attorney/ / f 
Dayle M. Jeffs " / ' 
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Exhibit B 
JODY K BURNETT 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P. 0. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
LEE A. FITZGERALD and HELEN 
FITZGERALD, SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Plaintiffs, « 
vs. 
UTAH COUNTY, a body corporate and Civil No. 82-C-0736G 
politic of the State of Utah and 
a governmental entity of 
the State of Utah, JEFF MENDENHALL, 
GORDON BUCKLEY ROSE, IVA SNELL 
and JOHN DOES 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
This matter came on for hearing before the above-entitled court, 
the Honorable J. Thomas Greene presiding, on December 22, 1987, 
on defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs were 
represented by M. Dayle Jeffs and defendants were represented by 
Jody K Burnett and Craig L. Barlow. The court reviewed the 
extensive memoranda of law with supporting affidavits and exhibits 
RECEIVED 
SEP 3 0 1988 
that had been filed, heard extensive oral argument on behalf of 
the parties, took the matter.under advisement, and being fully 
advised, thereafter issued its Memorandum Decision and Order 
dated September 7, 1988 in which it determined that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact as to all claims in the 
plaintiffs1 Amended Complaint, but reserving for later ruling 
the "defamation-plus" claim. Based on the foregoing and good 
cause appearing therefore, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that defendants, and each of 
them, are hereby granted summary judgment in their favor and 
against the plaintiffs on all of plaintiffs' claims except the 
"defamation-plus" claim and all such claims are hereby dismissed, 
with prejudice and upon the merits* 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court reserves ruling on 
the "defamation-plus" claim pending receipt of additional 
memoranda of law and factual materials relating to the applicability 
of that cause of action to the facts of this case. Counsel for 
plaintiffs are directed to supply the court on or before 
October 10, 19 88 with a further memorandum of law and materials 
regarding the "defamation-plus" cause of action. Thereafter, 
counsel for defendants should file a responsive memorandum by 
October 25, 1988. Upon receipt of the requested materials, that 
one remaining final aspect of the case will be deemed submitted to 
the court for a ruling thereon. 
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DATED this Aff day of ^^^T^rJA^ , 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
Copies mailed to counsel, 9-29-8^^ 
A. Dayle Jeffs, Esq. 
rheodore E. K a n e l l , Esq , 
3uy Burningham, Esq . 
Jody K. B u r n e t t , Esq . 
Robert B. Hansen , Esq . 
^A 
JUA&^^S-
J/ Thomas Greene 
ited States District Judge 
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M. DAYLE JEFFS, #G16 5 5 
JEFFS AND JEFFS 
Attorneys at Law, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
90 North 100 East 
P. O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
LELAND A. FITZGERALD and 
HELEN S. FITZGERALD, 
V. 
UTAH COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of 
Utah and a governmental 
entity of the State of Utah, 
JEFF MENDENHALL, GORDON 
BUCKLEY ROSE, IVA SNELL, 
KEITH RICHAN, JERIL WILSON, 
LYNN DAVIS and JOHN DOES 
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